Back to Russia

Slighted by the imposition of a 50 percent tariff on Indian exports, Prime Minister Narendra Modi moved swiftly to recalibrate New Delhi’s foreign relations. His decision to deepen economic and military cooperation with Vladimir Putin signals a robust effort to diversify India’s alliances. This maneuver underscores Modi’s determination to shield domestic industries from abrupt policy shifts in Washington. It also highlights the growing volatility of global trade as traditional friendships come under strain. Modi’s outreach to Russia is far from unprecedented. During the administrations of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, India relied heavily on Moscow for energy, defence hardware, and diplomatic backing, especially during conflicts with Pakistan. That legacy of strategic collaboration allowed New Delhi to balance Western influence throughout the Cold War and beyond. Today’s revival of those ties recalls a time when economic ideology took a backseat to geopolitical necessity. Yet Modi’s ideological inheritance diverges sharply from his predecessors’. He has long repudiated the socialist framework championed by Nehru and Gandhi, instead favouring market-driven capitalism paired with a nationalist ethos. His Bharatiya Janata Party remains unsentimental about public sector giants and left-leaning economic controls. In aligning again with Moscow, Modi is not embracing socialism; rather, he is seeking partners whose interests converge with his own vision of India’s rise. That vision is filtered through the lens of Hindu nationalist politics and a muscular brand of statecraft. The prime minister’s inclination is to tether India to blocs that promise immediate benefits to his core constituency. Whether it is defence contracts, energy deals, or technology transfers, Moscow ticks all the boxes. The challenge for Delhi is to ensure that these arrangements do not undermine India’s democratic institutions or long-term strategic autonomy. The widening chasm between New Delhi and Washington reflects deeper global realignments. Frictions with the United States, China, and Pakistan now dictate Delhi’s diplomatic dance. Each of these capitals wields leverage over New Delhi’s economic and security calculus, from trade barriers in the West to territorial disputes in the East. India’s foreign policy architects must therefore navigate a multipolar landscape with unprecedented dexterity. American tariffs, intended to shield domestic industries, may inadvertently galvanize a new wave of partnerships among the BRICS nations, Middle Eastern petro-states, and Asia’s emerging markets. In response to Washington’s protectionism, these economies are exploring reciprocal trade agreements and pooled investment vehicles. For India, this offers both opportunity and uncertainty: deeper integration with Russia could open up access to critical resources, but it risks alienating other potential markets. The sectors most exposed to tariff shocks include pharmaceuticals, food exports, information technology, and manufacturing. India’s competitive advantage in generics and software services rests on predictable trade regimes. Sudden duties can disrupt supply chains, inflate input costs, and erode profit margins. Policymakers in New Delhi must therefore pursue domestic reforms that bolster competitiveness even as they seek external markets. In the short term, the outlook may appear bleak. Indian exporters face immediate headwinds from levies imposed by a major consumer market. Yet the country’s long-term prospects remain resilient. After a decade of calibrating with the USA, the Modi government will be flying not back to the USSR but to Russia and hope to offset the recent episodic tariff trade disturbances.