The year 2025 in Nagaland unfolded amid persistent turbulence, marked by heightened civil society activism, administrative contestations, and a deepening sense of political drift. While public discourse remained animated across multiple fronts, the core Naga political issue continued to appear stranded, with no credible or hopeful resolution in sight despite decades of negotiations that have led to signing of two agreements between the government of India with the two main stakeholders- NSCN (I-M) in 2015 and the seven-member Working Committee of Naga National Political Groups (NNPGs) in 2017.
The biggest takeaway of 2025 was the merger of the ruling Nationalist Democratic Progressive Party (NDPP) with 32 MLAs and the Naga People’s Front (NPF) with two MLAs, at Kohima on October 21. It remains to be seen if the reunification of two parties with same roots will cement the efforts of the opposition-less government and achieve the desired Naga political solution.
Early in the year, the fragility of peace along the Assam–Nagaland boundary was starkly underscored when on January 7, an Assam Police team, while chasing a suspect, crossed into Yajang village in Mokokchung district. The Assam Police later claimed they had been misled by Google Maps, which allegedly marked a tea garden as falling within Assam’s jurisdiction. The incident served as a reminder that the boundary question, which has claimed lives over decades, remains volatile and unresolved.
The Disturbed Area Belt (DAB) especially along Mokokchung-Jorhat/Sivasagar districts continue to attract attention not only for the boundary dispute, but also possessing a huge quantity of crude oil which is being extracted by Assam.
The top agenda of the post-2003 government(s) in Nagaland was for Naga political solution orchestrated with the oft-invoked political rhetoric of “Naga unity” for “Naga solution” which appeared increasingly hollow as events unfolded. Rather than consolidation, the year witnessed sharper tribal alignments and alliances operating under separate umbrellas, reflecting a society that is formally together but substantively discordant.
The larger Naga political settlement continued to drift. Promises made as far back as the 2003 elections-that a solution would be achieved within months -now appear almost ironic. Instead of convergence, Naga Political Groups (NPGs) have undergone repeated splits. From four factions in 2003, their number has ballooned to nearly 30 by 2025, despite years of consultations and repeated calls for unity. The divide between the NSCN (I-M), which insists that the 2015 Framework Agreement be the sole basis of a settlement, and the Working Committee of the Naga National Political Groups (NNPGs), which stands by the 2017 Agreed Position, widened further.
The NNPGs argued that insistence on the Framework Agreement-particularly demands for a separate flag and constitution-would permanently deadlock talks, given the Centre’s categorical rejection of those demands. Tensions spiked in February when 21 MPs from the Northeast urged the Centre to expedite a solution based on the Framework Agreement, drawing sharp rebuke from the NNPGs.
This fragmentation was sharpened by the enduring demand for a separate Frontier Nagaland Territory (FNT), spearheaded by the Eastern Nagaland People’s Organisation (ENPO). The issue is yet to be debated in full in the Legislative Assembly, instead, the Eastern Nagaland Legislators’ Union (ENLU) was tasked with engaging with ENPO. While proposals were exchanged between the state and the Centre and official sources hinted at a possible resolution, though skepticism on the ground remained pronounced.
It was also a year when scores of CSOs and NGOs have expressed deep anguish and frustration at the continual blatant violation of cease fire ground rule signed between the government of India with all those groups currently in cease fire.
Public frustration intensified as law-and-order concerns mounted. Despite ceasefire agreements, incidents of extortion, threats, abductions, and unprovoked firing by armed groups persisted. One NSCN faction, in particular, came under sustained criticism for arbitrary taxation, intimidation of civilians, and armed intrusions into villages. Such actions deepened public mistrust and fear. In response, the Chümoukedima District Village Councils’ Association formally wrote to the Chairman of the Ceasefire Monitoring Group on September 28, seeking urgent review and amendment of the Ceasefire Ground Rules. Villages such as Diphupar witnessed protest rallies demanding “sanitisation” of their areas to restore a sense of safety. Across districts, there were growing demands for the police and ceasefire authorities to enforce the rule of law without fear or favour.
Concerns over policing and justice were further amplified by unresolved criminal cases. The April 8 murder of a woman near Pimla remained unsolved due largely to delayed forensic reports, once again exposing the inadequacy of forensic infrastructure in the state. The case reignited calls for fully functional forensic laboratories in Dimapur and Kohima. Meanwhile, a high-profile controversy involving IAS officer Renny Wilfred, accused of sexual harassment by multiple women employees of IDAN, led to the formation of a Special Investigation Team, drawing attention to issues of accountability within the bureaucracy.
The long-pending review of the state’s reservation policy resurfaced after five major tribes demanded changes, arguing that the existing quota system was outdated. With no decisive response from the government, agitation intensified. This coincided with protests by employee associations, including the Nagaland Medical Students’ Association (NMSA) over the regularisation of COVID appointees, and objections from state service officers over IAS induction nominations.
Politically, 2025 witnessed a dramatic realignment. The merger of NCP legislators led by Ajit Pawar with the ruling NDPP reshaped legislative arithmetic.
Later in the year, an even more significant shift occurred when the ruling Nationalist Democratic Progressive Party (NDPP) on October 18, resolved to merge with the Naga People’s Front (NPF) a move described as a “homecoming since the former was an offshoot of the latter.
The merger was formally ratified three days later, on October 21, during the NPF’s 63rd Foundation Day celebrations at a General Convention held at the Indira Gandhi Stadium in Kohima.
Following the merger, chief ninister Neiphiu Rio was elected as the new president of the NPF, marking his return to the party he had exited in 2017 to form the NDPP. Former NDPP president Chingwang Konyak was named president emeritus of NPF, signalling continuity and reconciliation within the regional political fold. The unification of the two parties was widely seen as an attempt to consolidate regional politics amid prolonged political uncertainty in the state.
The state also mourned the death of incumbent Governor La Ganesan on August 15. Manipur governor Ajay Kumar Bhalla was appointed as the 22nd Governor of Nagaland on August 25.
Civil society mobilisation also drew attention during the year. In pursuit of Naga unity, 16 Naga Political Groups (NPGs), 34 Tribal Hohos (from Nagaland, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam), and the Forum for Naga Reconciliation (FNR) met at Ungma Village on August 23, 2025. This led to the Ungma Statement, which called on all NPGs to unite on a common platform to articulate a shared political future, based on historical and political rights. The Nagaland Tribal Hohos Coordination Committee (NTHCC) publicly endorsed the Ungma initiative, urging broader support from other regions.
This was later followed up on September 27, 2025, when 15 Naga Political Groups (NPGs), 33 Naga Tribal Hohos, and the Forum for Naga Reconciliation (FNR) met to issue a declaration aimed at fostering unity, reconciliation, and a common approach to the Naga political issue.
However on November 18, the public response to another meeting called by the Naga Common Platform (CNP) was massive. The rally made a clear call on the Government of India to expedite a final settlement to the Naga political issue. The organisers argued that the Framework Agreement of 2015 and the Agreed Position of 2017 together provided sufficient basis for a single, inclusive solution. The speakers at the meeting also slammed the delay and questioned the various apex tribe bodies for opaqueness on the matter. The rally witnessed a large turnout despite opposition from some apex tribal bodies, reflecting growing grassroots impatience with prolonged political negotiations.
Meanwhile, debates over prohibition sharpened, with churches opposing any dilution of the NLTP Act even as urban NGOs advocated partial relaxation. Churches, led by the Nagaland Baptist Church Council (NBCC), remained firm in opposing any dilution of the Nagaland Liquor Total Prohibition (NLTP) Act. In contrast, several Dimapur-based civil society organisations and NGOs openly advocated for partial lifting of prohibition in urban areas, highlighting an ongoing divide in public opinion.
Religious gatherings emerged as a major social phenomenon, at times overshadowing cultural events. Although the proposed visit of Franklin Graham, son of late global evangelist Billy Graham, was cancelled due to restrictive conditions, a large evangelistic meeting was held in Kohima on November 30. Conducted by Rev. Dr. Robert Cunville of the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association and organised by the Kohima Baptist Pastors Fellowship, the event drew an estimated crowd of around 30,000.
Simultaneously, revival meetings in Dimapur recorded unprecedented attendance. A four-day revival programme led by Apostle Ankit Sajwan from December 2 to 5 at the Dimapur stadium drew an estimated 4.5 lakh attendees, one of the largest such gatherings in the state’s history. These events coincided with the Hornbill Festival, held at Kisama, which recorded a total footfall of 2,14,493 visitors over 10 days, including 1,55,534 local visitors, 56,431 domestic tourists, and 2,528 foreign tourists.
Several observers noted that the comparatively subdued Hornbill turnout may have been influenced by the scale and popularity of the revival meetings. Taken together, developments in politics, civil society mobilisation, and public life underscored a year in which Nagaland grappled with unresolved political and historical questions, even as an increasingly assertive public made its voice heard across multiple platforms.