A big bully

Donald Trump’s announcement on January 3, 2026, that United States forces had carried out a large-scale strike in Venezuela and seized President Nicolás Maduro and his wife marked a dramatic escalation in Washington’s approach to Latin America. Trump presented the operation as a law enforcement action rather than an act of war, arguing that it was necessary to protect American citizens from narco-terrorism and to bring a so called drug kingpin to justice. Protecting American citizens cannot be at the cost of Venezuelan citizens as some 40 were killed on January 3 US raid. Yet when placed in historical and regional perspective, the episode looks less like an unprecedented police operation and more like the revival of a familiar pattern. The USA has long relied on the language of drugs and crime to justify intervention in Latin America. That logic was firmly established in 1989 with Operation Just Cause, when president Manuel Noriega was removed from power and transported to the United States to stand trial. That intervention normalised the idea that Washington could forcibly remove a foreign leader and subject him to domestic courts. On January 3, Venezuela operation appears to follow the same script, updated for a new political moment. Maduro has been under US indictment since 2020, accused of turning state institutions into conduits for cocaine trafficking into North America. Trump has repeatedly described him as a cartel boss hiding behind presidential authority, insisting that military force is merely an extension of anti drug enforcement. The reality is that Venezuela is undeniably afflicted by corruption and criminal penetration, and its territory has been used as a transit route by Colombian armed groups. Yet available intelligence and drug market data continue to show that the bulk of cocaine entering the United States originates in Colombia and moves through Central America and the Caribbean. Even within American agencies, claims tying Maduro personally to large scale narco operations have often been described as thin or inconclusive. What exists is a criminal ecosystem, not a clear cut hierarchy that can be dismantled by capturing one leader. There is a dual vested interest in Trump’s strategy- Venezuela holds the world’s largest proven crude oil reserves, and Washington has for years sought to choke the regime’s finances through sanctions. On January 3, after Maduro’s capture, Trump announced that the US(read as American companies) will manage the oil business during the “transition period”. For many in Latin America, this reinforces long held suspicions that the drug war narrative is being used as a convenient moral cover for strategic influence and access to resources. If such actions become acceptable, powerful states could claim the right to abduct or assassinate foreign leaders simply by issuing domestic indictments. Decapitation tactics against cartels have rarely produced lasting reductions in drug supply. Criminal networks adapt quickly, replacing leaders and shifting routes while demand remains intact. Force may disrupt operations temporarily, but it cannot dismantle economies of crime embedded within state structures and global markets. The implications extend beyond Venezuela. Mexico, which faces far more lethal and entrenched drug cartels and is a major source of synthetic opioids entering the United States, will view the precedent with unease. A credible response to the drug economy must balance stringent enforcement with serious efforts to reduce demand, expand treatment, and disrupt financial networks. Where force is contemplated abroad, it must be constrained by international law and collective oversight.