A hostile neighbor

From the events unfolding since the overthrow of Sheikh Hasina as prime minister on August 5, 2025, Bangladesh appears to have slipped into a phase where authority is fragmented and coercive power has passed into the hands of criminal gangs, political enforcers and radical religious elements. The country that was born through bloodshed in 1971 and later liberated with decisive Indian intervention now finds itself overwhelmed by forces that thrive on disorder, fear and ideological extremism. What is unfolding is not merely political instability but a deeper erosion of state control, where violence has become both a method and a message. Large parts of Bangladesh today resemble a society under siege. Killings, targeted attacks and organised unrest have become disturbingly routine. Yet, amid this breakdown, a carefully crafted narrative has been gaining ground, one that seeks to redirect public anger outward by portraying India as the principal enemy. This sentiment is not emerging naturally from society at large but is being actively stoked by political factions hostile to the Awami League and to Sheikh Hasina’s legacy. Bangladesh has long been a major source of illegal migration into India, with estimates often placing the total number at around 20 million, concentrated mainly in Assam, Tripura and other parts of the Northeast. Instead of confronting governance failures, economic stress and lawlessness, sections of the political class and radical groups are finding it expedient to revive anti India rhetoric as a unifying distraction. The recent killing of radical youth leader Sharif Osman Hadi has acted as a catalyst. Protests and violent clashes have erupted across Dhaka, Chittagong, Rajshahi and other urban centres. Indian diplomatic premises have faced attacks and attempted marches, signalling a deliberate escalation. The interim administration under Muhammad Yunus is widely perceived as either too weak or too hesitant to assert control. This vacuum has allowed extremist groups to operate with growing confidence, creating pockets of near anarchy where the state’s presence is nominal at best. Analysts point to a coordinated effort by radical religious outfits, student groups aligned with them and pro Pakistan elements to convert the post Hasina transition into an explicitly anti India moment. The language used on the streets and online is telling. Calls for violence against Delhi, threats aimed at India’s Northeast and direct intimidation of Indian officials are not spontaneous expressions of public anger. They are instruments of mobilisation designed to manufacture an external adversary and deflect attention from domestic collapse. There is also growing concern about the role of vested interests and foreign actors. Commentators in both India and Bangladesh have warned of the involvement of Pakistan’s intelligence networks and sections of the overseas diaspora in amplifying hostile narratives through social media and proxy activism. Investigations, including those by independent research groups, suggest that elements within the interim setup and opposition ranks have indulged this rhetoric to shore up their own political standing, even as radical forces slip beyond control. What is taking shape, therefore, is a dangerous normalisation of disorder under the banner of nationalism directed against India. Bangladesh’s current unrest is less about a unified national sentiment and more about power struggles within a weakened state. Anti India hostility has become a convenient tool for those seeking relevance and leverage in a fractured political landscape. The tragedy is that this path deepens instability at home while poisoning a relationship that once stood on shared history, sacrifice and mutual interest.