Economic neighbors

India and China today exist in a delicate balance: neighbors who are neither allies nor outright rivals, yet bound by geography and circumstance. This unusual equilibrium has been shaped, in part, by the erratic policies of U.S. President Donald Trump, whose tariffs and shifting alliances unsettled regional dynamics. Against this backdrop, multilateral forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS have become important platforms where India and China meet, if not as friends, then at least as participants in dialogue. The SCO, founded in 2001 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, has since expanded to include India, Pakistan, and Iran. With a combined population of over 2.1 billion and a nominal GDP estimated between $30 and $40 trillion, the SCO is formidable on paper. Its central mission remains focused on what it calls the “three evils”: terrorism, extremism, and separatism. Security cooperation, joint military drills, and intelligence-sharing form the backbone of its work. While economic integration has lagged, the SCO still promotes trade, connectivity, and energy cooperation across Eurasia. By contrast, BRICS, originally comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, functions on a broader global stage. Its membership now represents about 3.3 billion people and a GDP in the same $28–40 trillion range. Unlike the SCO, BRICS is less about regional security and more about shaping international financial and economic institutions. With its New Development Bank and initiatives for trade in local currencies, BRICS has begun to position itself as a counterweight to Western-dominated systems like the IMF and World Bank. For India, being part of both SCO and BRICS serves different strategic needs. The SCO helps manage regional stability, providing channels for dialogue with China and Pakistan-neighbors with whom disputes remain unresolved. Yet the SCO is not a border-resolution mechanism; territorial disputes, especially along the India-China frontier, must still be addressed bilaterally. BRICS, meanwhile, gives India a seat at the global economic table alongside other major emerging economies, a forum where its strategic autonomy and developmental aspirations find resonance. Still, fault lines remain. China’s close ties with Pakistan are evident, most recently in Operation Sindoor, where Chinese rockets and radar reportedly played a significant role in supporting Islamabad. Beijing has long been Pakistan’s most reliable ally and is unlikely to abandon that relationship in deference to India. Nor has Washington been a consistent partner. During Trump’s tenure, Pakistan’s military chief was courted at the White House even as India faced steep tariffs of 59 percent compared to Pakistan’s 15 percent-a reminder of the double game often played by great powers. The challenge, therefore, is to use these forums not as cure-alls but as pressure valves. SCO and BRICS are unlikely to resolve India-China tensions or erase decades of mistrust. Yet they provide space for conversation, cooperation on global and regional issues, and opportunities for economic engagement. In a fractured world order, even limited platforms for dialogue and trade matter. For India and China, remaining engaged in both forums is less about friendship and more about managing rivalry-while keeping the doors to stability and prosperity open.