With peace supposedly returning in Gaza, a new geopolitical theater is emerging in Southeast Asia’s Myanmar. This part of the world has become another chessboard in the game of power and politics between global powers America, China, Russia, and India.
Presently, China is the dominant player in both Bangladesh and Myanmar, influencing both countries not only economically with infrastructure developments and investments but also with military aid and hardware. However, there have been reports of new activities by America in this region recently to challenge China’s dominance in both countries and access to the Bay of Bengal.
After the 2021 military coup in Myanmar, which started a devastating war, the violence remains relentless. Myanmar is collapsing in real time. Nearly all major ethnic groups are fighting one another. The resulting power vacuum has turned Myanmar into a hub for narcotics production, human trafficking, cyber scams and weapons smuggling.
It has also quietly become a regional proxy war, drawing in China, India, Russia, and the United States. These competing powers now shape what has become a widely recognized failed state, and they may ultimately determine how long the conflict lasts. That’s how it works in geopolitics.
Much of the country, however, has fallen outside the government’s control. Patchworks of separatist strongholds now dominate vast areas, each pursuing its own political goals. In the north, the Kachin Independence Army seeks full autonomy for Kachin State, if not outright independence. The Naga Self-Administered Zone is controlled by the Naga Army and presently under cease fire with the military junta.
In the west, the Arakan Army is pushing for a self-governed Rakhine nation with ambitions of breaking away entirely. In Chin State, various militias have turned against both the central government and one another, with each vying to represent a future independent Chin land. In the east, Kareen and Kareni armed groups continue their long-standing fight for ethnic homelands, while Shan State remains splintered between rival factions, some of which favor federal autonomy, others complete secession.
Beyond these ethnic groups, the People’s Defense Force, which was formed by the exiled civilian government, now operates across central and southern Myanmar. It is fighting to overthrow the military government and, supposedly, replace it with a federal democracy. Though not rooted in any single ethnicity, its growing presence has strained relations with ethnic militias, many of whom reject the idea of any future union altogether.
Meanwhile, foreign powers have steadily taken sides behind the scenes; they’re arming proxies, funding factions, and shaping outcomes from the shadows. China, with its deep investments and strategic stakes, has the most to gain or lose, but Beijing can’t fully back one side without risking blowback elsewhere. Instead, it has opted to play all sides on the ground. It supplies military hardware to the central government while turning a blind eye to Chinese-made weapons flowing to rebel factions. This balancing act has led to an unspoken rule in Myanmar. Despite ongoing hostilities, most armed groups avoid targeting Chinese assets such as pipelines, energy terminals, ports, and economic zones.
India has tried to copy China’s balancing strategy but has stumbled in the process. Its main focus has been securing the northeastern frontier, where separatist, nationalist, and insurgent groups operate from inside Myanmar. To counter this, India has quietly cooperated with Myanmar’s military leadership, sharing intelligence and carrying out cross-border operations. For instance, in July, an Indian drone strike eliminated several ULFA separatist commanders inside Myanmar and recently the drone attacks on Khammoi village that killed two innocent naga civilians.
However, unlike China, India lacks strong ties with Myanmar’s ethnic militias and has little economic leverage. America has taken a different approach. Rather than engaging directly, it has avoided arming the groups fighting the central government. Its support has been limited to non-lethal aid for the exiled civilian government, under which the People’s Defense Force operates. Most likely, though, Washington is providing more covert assistance than it publicly admits.
At the same time, the United States has been urging Thailand to play a more active role in Myanmar. Thailand, however, remains cautious. It has little interest in fueling instability in Myanmar, knowing it could easily spill across its borders. Thai lawmakers are also cautious about challenging China, given its grand strategic interests in the country. Myanmar is China’s only immediate neighbour that offers direct overland access to the Indian Ocean, i.e., the Bay of Bengal.
This access to the Bay of Bengal is vital, not just for exporting Chinese goods, but also for importing fossil fuels from the Middle East and minerals from Africa. This route bypasses the South China Sea and the congested Strait of Malacca, where the US Navy could potentially disrupt shipping during a major conflict. That’s why China has built oil and gas pipelines from the shores of the Bay of Bengal to its southern province of Yunnan, with plans to add highways and high-speed rail along the same route.
As part of the plan, Chinese state-owned companies are working on two major projects in Rakhine State: a $7.3 billion deep-water port at Kyaukphyu Township, and a $1.3 billion Special Economic Zone that includes an oil and gas terminal. Both projects sit at the southern end of Myanmar, and so, for Beijing, there can be no half-measures in Myanmar.
A pro-democracy movement took to the streets but was then swiftly and brutally crushed by the military. While the West imposed sanctions, China reached out, boosting cross-border trade and selling tanks, artillery, armored vehicles, anti-aircraft systems, and naval vessels. By doing so, China became Myanmar’s key foreign partner.
Yet, despite growing ties, the relationship was never built on trust. The fiercely nationalistic Myanmar military remained uneasy about its heavy dependence on China for arms and supplies. So, to reduce its reliance on China, Myanmar began building defense ties with Russia. It bought MiG-29 fighter jets and Mi-35 helicopter gunships, both of which are still used to this day. This Russian-supplied airpower has become increasingly crucial in recent years as government forces have struggled on the ground.
Helicopter gunships now frequently attack rebel-controlled towns and villages across the country. Russia has been instrumental to the central government in Myanmar. But with its attention and resources consumed by the war in Ukraine, it’s unclear how much of that support still continues today. While China and Russia cooperate closely in the Ukrainian battle space, they appear to be pursuing separate agendas in Myanmar.
America, for its part, has responded by imposing sanctions on Myanmar’s military government, targeting officials and their business interests. At the same time, a massive new U.S. consulate complex, is being built to replace and expand the existing facility in the northern Thai city of Chiang Mai. The consulate is widely believed to be part of a broader effort to expand American intelligence capabilities in the region. Once operational, Washington could use the new facility to supply intelligence to rebel factions and influence the course of the conflict.
Elsewhere, there are indications the U.S. may be deepening its involvement. Sources claim the U.S. is contemplating plans to establish a large supply base in Cox’s Bazaar in Bangladesh to support insurgent groups like the Arakan Army and the Chin National Front. They also suggest the U.S. could impose a no-fly zone over Rakhine State to neutralize the Myanmar Air Force from supporting its troops on the ground. The recent US-Bangladesh military drills in September 2025, including the air force, suggest a deeper involvement by the US in the region’s geopolitics.
The focus on Myanmar’s western coast makes strategic sense. Establishing friendly or autonomous territories near the Indian and Bangladeshi borders would put pressure on China’s overland corridor from Yunnan and threaten its access to the deepwater port at Kyaukphyu. However, while Washington works to undermine China’s corridor, Beijing is working just as hard to entrench its dominance.
Since the coup, China has sold over hundreds of million dollars’ worth of weapons to the Myanmar central government while also quietly arming rebel groups, especially in the north. By playing both sides, China has now become the sole external power able to broker peace. If this plays out, Chinese interests will inevitably clash with American designs.
As such, northeast India and the Naga homeland will experience the rippling effects created by the power struggle between these two superpowers and their allies. And with such developments taking shape in our neighborhood, it is a good time for the Nagas to unite. Apex Naga bodies like the NNC, the NSCN, the NSF, the Naga Hoho and the invigorated NPF must keep track of the developments in our backyard, because in this regional geopolitical game, India is not the only dominant player that has the power to influence and shape our future. Kuknalim.
R. Francis Kikon.
Naharbari, Dimapur.
Monday, November 10, 2025