Re-operating Bluestar

National politics is about timing and so, when former Union Minister and veteran Congress leader P. Chidambaram recently labeled ‘Operation Bluestar’ a “mistake,” it sent ripples not merely through historical discourse but through the brittle edifice of the Congress party itself. The question is -why now? Decades after the 1984 military action in the Golden Temple, and at a time when the Congress finds itself trying to navigate a prolonged period in the political wilderness, such historical revisionism raises more questions about present-day political calculations than past policy decisions. For many, Chidambaram’s pronouncement appears to be a calculated move- where a prominent intellectual face of the party is trying to insulate himself from the most controversial legacy of the Nehru-Gandhi family. Operation Bluestar was, for all its tragic fallout, an executive decision made at the highest levels of the Indira Gandhi government. It was an action she deemed necessary to counter a grave internal security threat. The logic of the time, as history records, left little options- either act decisively or risk allowing Pakistan-backed Khalistani militants, led by Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale to escalate a campaign of terror and assassinations, potentially leading to the balkanization of Punjab. Had the government hesitated, the internal security collapse could have offered a clear opportunity for external forces to create further mayhem. Even the widely-acclaimed efforts of police chiefs like K.P.S. Gill or Julio Rebeiro, who suppressed the insurgency through a forceful approach, would have been impossible without the prior, albeit costly, assertion of state authority. Chidambaram’s belated view, probably implies that an alternative, more peaceful solution was viable- a debatable proposition given the armed and lethal presence of militants, including renegade army Brigadier Shubeg Singh, within the temple complex. By his reckoning, if the crushing of militancy was a mistake, how then does one reconcile the brutal assassination of Indira Gandhi by her own Sikh bodyguards, an act widely viewed as a direct and tragic corollary to the operation? To condemn one without mitigating the other is to engage in selective morality that risks blurring the lines between state action and retaliatory terror. The real significance of the remark, however, lies in its political context within the Congress party. For decades, the intellectual diversity within the Congress- from centrists to the extreme left- was unified and legitimized by the undisputed authority of the Nehru-Gandhi family. This fealty was largely unconditional while the party held power. Now, with the Congress struggling to reclaim its political space and regional partners increasingly exasperated by its perceived self-importance, opportunistic leaders are beginning to fret. In this climate of desperation, Chidambaram’s statement is less a genuine historical admission and more like a sign of the increasing ‘jitters’ among the old guard. While Rahul Gandhi may lack needed political maturity of his predecessors, his tenacity remains. Yet, the persistent whispers of dissent from seniors, including those who left or now making noise, highlight a deep-seated frustration with the party’s current predicament. Operation Bluestar may have been a tragic miscalculation, a high-stakes gamble with devastating collateral damage but to label it a ‘mistake’ now, seemingly to score political points or distance oneself from a weakening central command, suggests a political calculation afflicted by a greater, more pressing political aberration – the fear of irrelevance.