Rebranding policies

Since the 2014 launch of the Act East Policy, Nagaland has been celebrated as a “gateway” to ASEAN markets in Myanmar, Thailand, and Bangladesh. Grand plans are announced-highways, trade facilitation centres, agricultural corridors yet for most small farmers, artisans, and micro entrepreneurs in the state, the real impact remains distant and thin. The policy sounds promising, but the key question is whether these neighbouring markets are actually raising incomes and stabilising livelihoods for Nagaland’s producers, or whether they remain more a line in reports than a lived reality. Official data show that agriculture accounts for about 30 per cent of Nagaland’s GSDP and employs over 60 per cent of the workforce, yet the state still imports many basic food items, including edible oil, pulses, and even packaged staples. If Nagaland is truly a gateway to Myanmar, Thailand, and Bangladesh, why is it not turning that strategic location into a consistent export advantage? Trade promotion agencies like SHEFEXIL describe the Northeast as a “paradise waiting to be touched by prosperity,” but on the ground truth is that niche products such as King Chilli (Naga chilli), bamboo shoots, ginger, fermented fish, and organic vegetables still struggle to secure regular, high value contracts in ASEAN or Bangladesh. A major obstacle is logistics and quality. The India–Myanmar–Thailand trilateral highway and related connectivity projects are often held up as transformative, yet delays, poor road conditions, and weak last mile transport in Nagaland mean that even when farmers produce good crops, transport costs and travel time can wipe out any profit margin. Studies on India–Myanmar border trade show that flows are still heavily skewed toward informal import of consumer goods from India into Myanmar, while reverse agricultural exports remain thin, unorganised, and dominated by small scale traders rather than formal contract farming. In this environment, Nagaland’s smallholders become peripheral players, not central beneficiaries. Another problem is the gap between policy and practice. Nagaland has strong potential in horticulture, spices, and organic produce, but the Act East agenda on the ground looks more like a series of trade fairs, seminars, and one off schemes than a coherent, long term strategy for market linkages and value addition. There is still a lack of post harvest infrastructure-cold storage, processing units, and packaging centres-that could allow farmers to meet the quality and consistency standards demanded by Thai, Bangladeshi, or other ASEAN buyers. Evidence from studies on Konyak communities also suggests that uncritical push into market linked agriculture can sometimes undermine traditional food systems, squeezing land and labour toward commercial crops without guaranteed prices or stable demand. So, are the markets in Myanmar, Thailand, and Bangladesh actually helping Nagaland’s producers? The honest answer is- only for a small minority who have access to transport, capital, and market information. For the majority, these markets remain distant, fragmented, and risky. Unless the Centre and Nagaland government shift from connectivity slogans to concrete support-investment in cold chains, farmer centred export clusters, fair credit, and clear branding for Nagaland’s GI type products-the Act East Policy will stay more a geopolitical narrative than a genuine livelihood transforming project for the state.