Three wheels of Manipur

Yumnam Khemchand Singh’s swearing-in as Manipur Chief Minister on February 4, 2026, marks the end of nearly a year under President’s Rul-a moment many view as a tentative opening after sustained violence. Yet hope must contend with harsh reality. Singh, a BJP stalwart and former Assembly Speaker from the Meitei community, inherits a state fractured along ethnic lines since May 2023, when then BJP chief minister Biren Singh presided over violence that claimed over 260 lives and displaced tens of thousands. The cabinet’s composition-including Deputy Chief Ministers from Kuki(Nemcha Kigpen of BJP) and Naga( L.Dikho of NPF) signal the BJP’s intent to symbolically bridge valley and hills. This architectural inclusivity projects national resolve to heal a wounded state. Yet symbolism alone will not counter the ground reality: hardline Kuki militant outfits, including the Kuki National Army and Zomi Revolutionary Army, have already rejected the ministry outright. Their dismissal of deputies as tokenism and their vow of “no truck with Imphal” transcend rhetoric. These are declarations that armed factions, not elected representatives, command hill politics-a reality Singh cannot legislate away. Today, Manipur embodies one of India’s most intractable internal crises: a landscape divided into Meitei valley enclaves competing with hill strongholds occupied by Kukis and huge tracts of Naga hills belonging to Nagas but placed under Kuki dominated local administration. All these have rendered institutional authority to hollow out parallel governance structures. This militant intransigence is rooted in legitimate grievances that three years have only deepened. Meitei demands for Scheduled Tribe status triggered Kuki anxieties about land encroachment; burned villages and sexual violence remain largely unpunished; displacement camps fester with trauma. Armed groups have weaponized this bitterness, exploiting porous Myanmar borders to arm themselves, recruiting from the desperate, and financing operations through extortion. Recent ambushes and IED attacks following Singh’s oath demonstrate their capacity to impose costly stalemate-checkpoints that trap civilians, economies that atrophy, and the perpetual threat of escalation. For Singh, the strategic dilemma is paralyzing. Heavy-handed coercion risks reigniting the very violence he must suppress; yet without meaningful engagement on disarmament, rehabilitation, and free movement, infrastructure promises remain hollow to those behind militia checkpoints. Adding complexity: a triangular distrust between Meiteis fearing valley squeeze, Kukis demanding hill autonomy, and Nagas navigating precarious neutrality while facing systematic marginalization from both communities and valley-centric governance. Nagas articulate deep grievances rooted in land rights, political autonomy, and cultural erosion. An unwritten Meitei-Kuki alliance, forged under Meitei dominance, for decades, strategically perpetuates Naga marginalization. Electoral manipulation fragments hill voices; resource bias starves Naga districts while fueling inter-community tensions over poppy cultivation. The result is systemic disenfranchisement-Nagas trapped between valley hegemony and tribal competition, demanding equity beyond rhetoric. Real progress demands more than cabinet shuffles. It requires credible power-sharing that makes exclusion costly, coupled with measurable actions restoring confidence in law and property rights. Singh’s modest gestures-camp visits, rehabilitation emphasis-must translate into concrete delivery. The true strategic moment belongs to Kukis and Nagas themselves: can they unite around institutional redress and political inclusion, preventing manipulation by violent actors and partisan elites? Collective hill agency could isolate militants and create negotiation space. Manipur oscillates between cautious reconciliation and deeper lawlessness. Success hinges not on pomp but on patient, hard-headed politics combining security with justice and symbolism with structural redress. Only then can the state rebuild shared belonging rather than community enclaves.