War and politics

Israel’s political deadlock is no longer merely an internal crisis. The latest election results have left the country without a clear governing majority. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc secured 53 of the 120 seats, Gadi Eisenkot’s opposition bloc won 48, while Arab-led parties captured a record 19 seats. With 61 seats required for a majority, neither main bloc can govern alone. This impasse is becoming a strategic liability as tensions with Iran threaten to draw West Asia into a wider conflict. The results expose a fundamental contradiction in Israeli politics. Arab parties have become central to forming any viable government, yet their participation remains unacceptable to significant sections of the political establishment. Both camps are caught between parliamentary arithmetic and ideological positions that leave little room for compromise. Netanyahu may continue as caretaker prime minister, but a government without a mandate and stable parliamentary support will struggle to undertake diplomatic initiatives, negotiate settlements or reshape national security policy. The present deadlock, however, goes beyond coalition negotiations. A caretaker administration can manage routine affairs, but it is poorly placed to make decisions with lasting consequences, especially when those decisions could determine the course of regional conflict. The confrontation with Iran makes the paralysis particularly dangerous. Israel regards Iran’s nuclear ambitions, missile capabilities and regional influence as serious security threats. Tehran, in turn, views Israeli military operations and American support as efforts to weaken its strategic position. Each side presents its actions as necessary for security, while strikes and retaliation increase the risk of a wider war. The United States under President Donald Trump adds another layer of uncertainty. Washington’s military and diplomatic backing strengthens Israel, but it also raises questions about whether such support could encourage objectives beyond containing Iran’s military capabilities. Talk of regime change in Iran deserves scrutiny. Military strikes may destroy infrastructure and weaken military installations, but they cannot guarantee a stable political order. Iran is a large country with established institutions and a strong national identity. External pressure could strengthen hardline elements, deepen public resistance and prompt Tehran to adopt more aggressive security measures. Overthrowing a government is not the same as creating a stable successor. The consequences could reach beyond the battlefield, affecting regional security, energy supplies and international trade. An opposition-led government would not automatically end the confrontation with Iran or resolve the Palestinian question. Nor would a change of leadership remove the threats posed by Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis. A broader coalition could, however, create space for a different approach, combining military preparedness with diplomacy and renewed engagement with Arab states. It could also encourage a clearer distinction between immediate security needs and open-ended military objectives. The irony is that Arab parties whose support may be essential to breaking the deadlock continue to face resistance as coalition partners. Their inclusion would not guarantee reconciliation, but excluding them perpetuates a political contradiction Israel can ill afford.The danger is that political paralysis and military escalation will reinforce each other. Hardliners gain influence, diplomacy loses ground and every retaliation makes compromise harder. Military superiority cannot substitute for political stability, nor can electoral arithmetic indefinitely override the need for broader representation. Without a political settlement at home and a credible diplomatic approach abroad, the confrontation with Iran risks becoming a permanent crisis with no clear exit.